|Denotation, naming: specify a word or phrase for an object. Related terms description designation.|
|Quine, Willard Van Orman
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Indefinite terms do not denote objects - An indefinite singular terms must therefore be in a purely denoting position: E.g. "The tax auditor is looking for someone" (position denoting - "someone" not denoting).
"Purely denoting" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) not: "Tullius was a Roman" is
trochaic - E.g. tax auditor/director -> propositional attitudes - expression in quote marks not purely denoting - ambiguous reference - every truth function is transparent for denotation.
Words denote - sentences do not. (No singular term) - Nevertheless, a sentence has a meaning: the singular term formed by bracketing of the sentence (no proposition) - Proposition here: completion of correct sentence to a timeless one - timeless sentence "The door is open": which door? denotes nothing.
Object: what is denoted by singular terms, names, accepted as values - (But singular term eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness".
II 61 ff
Naming: Name or singular term - denoting: predict - both are referencing, not meaning
various descriptions can name the same thing but have different meaning.
Singular term/Quine: must not denote - gap between meaning and denotation.
- - -
Singular terms/Quine: designate ("name"). - A general term: means (denotes). - (> description).
Purely denoting position/Quine: E.g. "Giorgione was called so because of his size"- "so" not purely denoting - right: "Giorgione was called Giorgione because..." - then usable: "Barbarelli was called Giorgione because..." - missing substitutability signals not purely denoting position - one might say: The following incidents were - non-denoting: "9" and "Evening Star" or "number of planets" in (15) - (17) but it is not about that. The point is that the substitution makes true statements false.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003