Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Bridge laws: provide relations between the terms of two theories, if one of the theories is to be reduced to the other. See also reduction, reductionism, theories.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Fodor, Jerry
 
Books on Amazon
Bridge Laws I 135
Law/Natural Law/reductionism/connectives/interpretation/Fodor: Question: how the connective ">" is to be interpreted (in the reduction of a science to physics), is he transitive? - (generally accepted) - then there will have to be appropriate bridge laws - problem: the interpretation of the connective ">" in bridge laws themselves: is reductionism itself therefore a physical thesis - it cannot be equated with "caused", because that is asymmetric - if ">" any other relation than identity, then the truth of reductionism will only guarantee the truth of a weak version of physicalism - that it is nomologically necessary that the S and P predicates apply to the same objects - (this is the bridge law) - this is consistent with a non-physicalist ontology - e.g. that x-™ s fulfillment of S itself is not a physical event - some authors: bridge laws therefore express contingent event identity- (> token physicalism)

F/L
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28