Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Cogito: "I think". According to Descartes the prove that I exist, because the subject may even reach the doubts about its existence just by thinking and the subject must exist in order to think. Kant speaks of the "I think" that must accompany all my ideas/conceptions/notions/presentations, in order to make them my representations.See also thinking, existence, justification, representation.
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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Concept Summary/Quotes Sources

A. Prior on Cogito - Dictionary of Arguments

I 91
cogito / Prior: you can think that you think something and this could be the only thing you think, but not the only one that is true and then this is not necessarily true.
>Levels/order
, >Description levels, >Thinking, >Truth.
Then there must be something else real than what you think. - It can never be the only imaginary proposition that there are true propositions.
>Propositions, >Predication.

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20
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