Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Computation, Philosophy: among others, the hypothesis that the brain processes signals by algorithms. It is the question of how distinct a mapping relation must be or can ever be between unspecified symbols. Another problem is how far both sides have to be designed semantically._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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J. Fodor on Computation - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 179 Computation/Fodor/Lepore: thesis: causal relationships reconstruct inferential relations. This is considered to be the hope of an association of semantics with psychology but without a causal theory of analyticity this strategy is not available for a philosopher who connects the meaning with the inferential role in an analytical inference (CRT - conceptual role theory), e.g. "brown cows are dangerous": here one must recognize that this is not analytic. (CRT: >Conceptual role semantics.) >Analyticity/syntheticity, >Inferential role, >Causality. _____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |