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|Computer Model||I 259
Vs Analogy Brain/Computer/Rorty: this Analogy is trivial, because a program only codifies a set of operations, and explains thinking as little as a set of logical formulas explains the laws of inference. A code adds nothing! (No additional insight).
Rorty (referring to Dodwell): As long as we are at the level of subroutines, we cannot be attributed to specified intelligence and character. No more than the talk of "red sensations" determines the assumption of internally red entities. However, if we ascend to the hardware level, the anthropomorphism is no longer appropriate.
If we restricted ourselves to the hardware level, sensations would play no role anymore. Then, the computer analogy is no longer relevant, as little as with unicellular organisms. Complicated physiology arouses the need for psychology!
RortyVsComputer Model (Hardware/Software): depends on the choice of the level of abstraction
Question: how can the computer figure out that the current patterns flowing through the wire are the sum of the cash earnings of the day? ((s) This is determined only from the outside as an interpretation.) Rorty: it is not about studying the mode of operation at all. We will not clarify whether we should concede robots personal rights by better exploring how they work.
Computer/Pragmatism: The question of whether computers have consciousness, which is so important for Searle and Thomas Nagel, does not even arise for pragmatism. The only form to confront of the world is the same for people as for computers.
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000