Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Continuants: temporally extended entities as opposed to events or occurrences. There is a debate about whether continuants themselves can have temporal parts. See also endurantism, perdurantism, ontology, person, four-dimensionalism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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R. Chisholm on Continuants - Dictionary of Arguments
II 176 ff Continuant/Chisholm/Simons: E.g. people, trees, cars, water waves: precisely not mereologically constant. >Mereology. Continuants are subject to flow of their parts - most parts are not necessary - no mereological essentialism. >Parts. Solution: ens sukzessivum/E.S.: not itself permanent, itself constituted from continuants E.g. ens sukzessivum: President of the United States - (Simons:this is ontologically dubious). - ens sukzessivum is modally analogous to non-negative situations. >Situations: For the terminology of mereology cf. >Peter Simons. II 178 Problem: entia sukzessiva must not have any negative parts. II 179 Solution: by adding parts an object can stop to exist. E.g. egg in fertilization. Also see >Perdurantism, >Endurantism. Simons, Peter. Tractatus Mereologico-Philosophicus? In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Chisholm
> Counter arguments in relation to Continuants
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20