Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Continuants: temporally extended entities as opposed to events or occurrences. There is a debate about whether continuants themselves can have temporal parts. See also endurantism, perdurantism, ontology, person, four-dimensionalism.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Simons, Peter
Books on Amazon
Continuants I 117
Continuant/Broad: has no temporal parts, only spatial parts - Contrast: Event: spatial and temporal parts - Continuant: E.g. human - Point: that is why he is able to change - ((s) otherwise question of whether he remains the same) - Contrast: Occurrence/Broad: event - event cannot change - ((s) human (continuant) can grow old - event cannot grow old.)
I 127
Continuants/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: things that can have mass are continuants - and they are used in the argument of the RT that nothing which has a mass can be accelerated beyond the speed of light.
I 173
Continuants/Locke: constant clusters of matter - cannot lose or gain any parts - SimonsVsLocke
I 175
Temporal Part/Continuants/Mereology/SimonsVsAll: Thesis even continuants can have temporal parts - i.e. they are not mereologically constant, but mereologically variable - Simons Thesis: continuants can also have an interrupted existence.
I 176
Continuants/Simons: not all have to be material things: e.g. smile, nodes, waves: they are rather disruptions of material things.
I 180
Def Coincidence/Continuants/Simons: coincidence predicate: CTD5 a < I 187
Continuant/ChisholmVsAll: Thesis: is mereologically constant - mereologically variable continuants are not really primary substances, but rather logical constructions of mereologically constant continuants - organisms only constructions.
I 305
Event/Continuants/Simons: Event: Here, a formula like "a I 350
Continuant/Simons: events happen to a person and are called their life (life story). Context: not all events of a life are causally connected - Solution: genetic identity (gene-identical): i.e. all events involve a single continuant.
I 351
Continuant/Temporal Relationship/Simons: it is not the continuant, which belongs together, but his life story - HumeVsContinuants, RussellVsContinuants: reduction to events, continuants mere clothesline - whether a continuant exists depends on whether there is a life story to it -" I 353 Simons: nothing maintains their continuous existence.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

> Counter arguments against Simons
> Counter arguments in relation to Continuants

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26