Books on Amazon
|Representation (Presentation)||Rorty I 269 ff
Rationality/Fodor/Rorty: rationality: at least some properties of the language of thought must be represented in the language of thought, because the ability to represent representations is probably a necessary pre-condition for the ability to manipulate representations in a rational way.
((s) makes language of thought unnecessary: self-reference could also be implemented differently. One would only have to postulate something that is self-referential.)
Rorty I 269 ff
Fodor: representations in the processors are not pictures, but propositions in relation to which the subject has attitudes. Unless they fall under Sellars critique of the empirical fact concept.
However, these representations are not necessarily propositions in relation to which the subject has attitudes. Rather, the attitudes of the object lead to the propositions.
Rorty I 269 ff
DennettVsFodor: two subjects can absolutely believe the same, although their respective processors do not even speak the same language. Thus, it requires no conclusions from the propositions of processors to the propositions the subject will believe.
Unlike the "ideas" of the empiricist concept, the causal process does not require any chain of inferences to suit it and to justify the opinions of the person.
Explanations may have a private character, justification is public in as far as differences of opinion between different persons do not refer to the functioning of their tricky heads nor should refer to it.
J. Fodor/E. Lepore
Holism Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000