Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Definition: determination of the use of linguistic signs (words, symbols, connectives) for non-linguistic or linguistic objects. New definitions are not supposed to be creative, that is, they are to be derived from the use of the signs already employed. See also definability, conservativity, systems, theories, models, reference systems, context definition, explicit defnition, implicit definition.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Frege, Gottlob
Books on Amazon
Definitions III 15
Definition/Frege: you cannot define: "The number one is a thing", because there is a definite on the one side of the equation and an indefinite article on the other.
III 78
Definition/Frege: specifying a mode of operation is not a definition.
III 99
Definition/Object/Introduction/Frege: the way in which an object was introduced is not a property of the object. - The definition of an object only specifies the use of a sign, it says nothing about the object. - ((s) here: introduction of an object in the speech = definition) - Introduction/Frege: after the introduction, the definition turns into a judgment about the object.
I 130
FregeVsFormalism: The F. only gives instructions for definitions - not definitions as such.
III 131
E.g. Number i/Frege: you have to re-explain the meaning of "sum". - FregeVsFormalism/FregeVsHilbert: it is not enough to demand only one meaning.
IV 100ff
Definition/Object/Frege: the definite article must be on both sides here. - Defining an object only specifying the use of a sign. - More interesting are definitions of properties.
IV 100ff
Indefinable/Frege: are truth and identity as a simple basic concepts. - Other AuthorsVs. > truth theories, > theories of meaning.

G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-26