Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Deflationism: collective term for theories that conceive truth as a property of sentences, not as something that should be realized (> pragmatism). The basis for deflationism is the scheme of Tarki’s definition of truth like "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. See also disquotationalism, theories of truth, truth definition, meaning theory, meaning holism, holism, prosentential theory, translation, pragmatism.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Wright, Crispin
Books on Amazon
Deflationism I 26ff
Deflationismus: is directed against the "swelling" by creating more truth predicates: legitimate assertibility next to truth (> redundancy theory).Thesis truth no property, only a means of disquotation.
I 46
Deflation/Ramsey: was here first. (Recently: Horwich: "minimalism"): Truth assertorical - claiming, but not supported by adoption of metaphysical objects or situations - Tarski disquotation is sufficient.
Truth no substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common. - (> Rorty,> Brandom).
Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content. One can "truly" "approximate" the predicate. (Goldbach's presumption).
Deflationism thesis: the content of the truth predicate is the same as the claim, which makes its assertoric use.
Deflationismus/E.g. Goldbach's presumption: the Deflationismus recognizes that there must be said more byond Tarski also, E.g. "Everything he said is true."
VsDeflationism: not a theory but a "potpourri". There is no clear thesis.
I 47 ff
Inflationism: a) "true" is merely a means of affirming, only expresses attitudes towards sentences of (Rorty)?. Does not formulate a standard.
b) The disquotation scheme contains a (nearly) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. ("True").
I 293
Deflationism: every meaningful sentence (i.e. a sentence with truth-condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsity.
But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must to refer to a substantial property of statements.
(Deflationismus: truth no property).
I 27
Deflationism/Wright: truth no substantial property - disquotation is enough - "snow is white" and "grass is green" have nothing in common - content of the truth-predicate is the same as the claim which raises its claiming use - thesis the truth predicate is prescriptive and descriptive normative.
I 33 ~
Deflationism: the only standards of truth are the ones of legitimate assertibility (Assertibilität).
I 51
WrightVsDeflation: "minimalist", "minimalism".
I 97
Vs(classical) Deflationismus: no norm of truth-predicate may determine by itself that it is different from assertibility because the normative power of "true" and "assertible" coincides, but may diverge extensionally - then the disquotation scheme can play no central role - therefore statements may be true in a certain discourse, without being super-asserting - then truthmakers must be independent of our standards of recognisability (realism?).
Rorty I 38ff
Disquotation/Wright: the deflationist thinks through the Z-T-principle the content of the truth predicate would be completely determined.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24