|de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism.|
|Chisholm, Roderick M.
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|de re||I 30f
Meaning De Re/Chisholm: attributing another thing the property: you're meant by me as happy - Others Vs: such property does not exist, the spirit cannot leave the circle of his ideas.
E.g. Mach: de re with respect to himself: "what a shabby school master..." - but not de dicto: "I am a...".
De Dicto: the greatest man accepts the proposition that the greatest man is wise - De Re: there is an x such that x is the same as the greatest man, and x is considered to be wise by x
(P) The greatest man accepts the proposition that the greatest man is wise. (de dicto) -
(Q) There is an x such that x is the same as the greatest man, and x is considered to be wise by x. (de re) - (s) The greatest man thinks himself that he is wise - See below: (S"), (P"): direct attribution instead of de re and de dicto
"He Himself"/Chisholm: implies the expression de re, unlike the term de dicto.
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Chisholm II M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986
Belief De Re/Chisholm: a) due to the accepted proposition that X has the property F - b) strict form: further proposition knows that the object is the only one to possess the further property C - ("epistemic proximity").
But that does not help much, because this can still be a knowledge by description - that is the problem of intentionality - "epistemically closer relationship" still not found.
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Roderick M. Chisholm
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004