|de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism.|
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|de re||IV 49
De re (de dicto/possible world/Lewis: de re: language of our world, events in possible worlds. - de dicto: language from possible world (completely different meaning possible), events in possible world.
De re/Possible world/Lewis: first the denoted thing is identified in the actual real world and then the counterparts are found in the possible world - we do not even look at things that are denoted by subject terms in other possible worlds - de dicto: here we look at things that are designated by subject terms in other possible worlds.
De re/Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: E.g. "If Caesar had not crossed the Rubicon, he would never have been the Emperor" - is de re about - "the Emperor" - otherwise wrong: the Emperor would not have been the Emperor - right: "If x hadn’t …, x would not ..." - with that we are referring to the actual Emperor - Important argument: then we could also quantify through counterfactual conditionals (quantification via Counterfactual Conditional): "Every Emperor, who would not have been one, if he had not crossed the Rubicon, will wish in the end that he had crossed the Rubicon" - likewise: E.g. "every match ..." - logical form:
were A(x)>> would C(x).
Potentiality/Lewis: what is it then?
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991