|de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism.|
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|de re||Re III 129/30
Quine is prepared (until further analysis) to accepting the modality
de dicto: the attribution of modal properties to statements.
But true attributions de re are something entirely different. They mean that objects themselves have necessary properties. And that’s essentialism.
de re /ascriptions / Read: always essentialist - they claim material properties - III 135
Real namea create modal truths de re. »Cicero is necessaryly Tullius" is also true, for it refers to the same object. The simple truth is the modal truth de re.
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001