Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Schiffer, Stephen
Books on Amazon
de re I 60f
Belief de re/belief/proposition/complete contents/Schiffer: (2) - "Tanya believes that Gustav is a dog" - writes belief de re with respect to canis familiaris - complete I: contains a way of givenness of species (regardless whether it contains the species itself) - E.g. - "she is clever": complete I: not - problem: she may not be clever in any possible world, or the speaker does not recognize her again - if complete I, then he would have to believe it simultaneously and do not believe it - solution/Frege: different ways of givenness - VsProposition: - "she"-refers both times to Emily - therefore not complete I, but says only that the I contains any way of givenness - problem/Schiffer: we do not know what ways of givenness are and whether there are any - early: (1977 and 1978): I tried a description theory for thoughts de re, today Vs: that requires a too complex refined belief, that, for example, children cannot have.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29