Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

de re, philosophy: statements that refer to non-linguistic objects are de re. Here, most authors assume that the ascribed properties are contingent. An exception is essentialism which ascribes certain necessary properties to objects. See also de dicto, necessity de re, contingency, modality, essentialism.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Searle, John R.
Books on Amazon
de re II 247
De dicto: concernsg only the mental contents. - De re: relationships between people and objects - SearleVsQuine, VsPutnam: all beliefs are de dicto.
II 271
De re/de dicto/SearleVsQuine: is a distinction between different types of report - intentional states are not intensional by themselves. That is a mix of logical properties of reports with the states themselves - there is no "de re-setting" - only indexicals (VsKaplan, VsPerry).
VI 182f
De re/de dicto/Searle: not two different beliefs - Ralph's beliefs are the same in both cases - difference is in how far the reporting person wants to commit himself - Ralph cannot express this difference - the truth conditions are the same.

J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to de re

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24