|De se: belief de se is an attitude that one has towards oneself. Problem - self-identification is not completely safe from error. See also de re, de dicto.|
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|de se||Frank I 16 ~
Definition de se/Lewis: the self-attribution of individuating properties occurs with a belief de se (of oneself) - this cannot be analyzed as a belief de dicto - but vice versa: Belief de dicto and de re can be analyzed as a belief de se - narrower sense: self-attribution of properties that locate the individual in space and time - Castaneda: indexical references are not reducible to each other - VsLewis: therefore, apart from the belief de se, we actually also need a "de te", "de nunc", "de ibi" etc.
Lewis IV ~ 121
Attitudes de se/Lewis: the attitudes that you irreducibly have about yourself are not propositional - but they can also be expressed by sentences - but they are not propositions - e.g. one considers oneself a fool - then you express more a property than a proposition.
De se/Wish/Lewis: objects of wishes are often properties, not propositions - must not be shared by all the inhabitants of the same world - Proposition/Lewis/(s) is true or not true in a possible world - then it applies to all, not in relation to certain persons.
De se/Lewis: certain role (localization in a certain way) in possible world e.g. being the "winner" oneself (equivalent to property) - de dicto: only wish for world with winners and losers (equivalent to proposition) - E.g. 2 gods: the two do not differ with respect to any proposition - when it comes to sitting on the highest mountain and throwing Manna they can do it or leave it.
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989
Konventionen Berlin 1975
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994