Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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De se: belief de se is an attitude that one has towards oneself. Problem - self-identification is not completely safe from error. See also de re, de dicto.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Lewis, David
 
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de se Frank I 16 ~
Definition de se/Lewis: the self-attribution of individuating properties occurs with a belief de se (of oneself) - this cannot be analyzed as a belief de dicto - but vice versa: Belief de dicto and de re can be analyzed as a belief de se - narrower sense: self-attribution of properties that locate the individual in space and time - Castaneda: indexical references are not reducible to each other - VsLewis: therefore, apart from the belief de se, we actually also need a "de te", "de nunc", "de ibi" etc.
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Lewis IV ~ 121
Attitudes de se/Lewis: the attitudes that you irreducibly have about yourself are not propositional - but they can also be expressed by sentences - but they are not propositions - e.g. one considers oneself a fool - then you express more a property than a proposition.
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IV 145
De se/Wish/Lewis: objects of wishes are often properties, not propositions - must not be shared by all the inhabitants of the same world - Proposition/Lewis/(s) is true or not true in a possible world - then it applies to all, not in relation to certain persons.
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IV 145/146
De se/Lewis: certain role (localization in a certain way) in possible world e.g. being the "winner" oneself (equivalent to property) - de dicto: only wish for world with winners and losers (equivalent to proposition) - E.g. 2 gods: the two do not differ with respect to any proposition - when it comes to sitting on the highest mountain and throwing Manna they can do it or leave it.

LW I
D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LW II
D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LW IV
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

LW V
D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29