Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Determinism, philosophy: the idea that events and mental states occur due to strict laws and are therefore determined in advance. For a prediction one only has to know the environmental conditions. The fact that we do not know if determinism is true is sometimes explained by our incomplete knowledge of the environment. See also indeterminism, strict laws, prediction, probability, probabilism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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P.F. Strawson on Determinism - Dictionary of Arguments
Schulte III 441 Determinism/Tradition/Schulte: four different positions: 1. the position of the one who does not know what this thesis actually says. 2. the position of the pessimist, who thinks that the truth of the deterministic thesis will take away the ground of morality. 3. the position of the optimist, who declares the truth of determinism to be compatible with our concepts of duty and responsibility. 4. the position of the moral skeptic, who considers these concepts to be generally unfounded, regardless of whether determinism applies or not. Schulte III 441/442 Determinism/Optimism/Schulte: The optimist has no more to put forward than the undisputed efficiency of the concepts in regulating socially desirable behavior. Pessimism: The pessimist disputes, with some justification, the adequacy of this kind of reasoning. In his opinion, a completely different (metaphysical) concept of freedom must come into play: one that entails the falsity of determinism. "Commonplace": pertains to the central importance we attach to our actions, thoughts, and feelings. Schulte III 443 Determinism: Question: would we be forced by the conviction of the truth of determinism to generally assume the "objective" attitude towards all other people and thus destroy the basis of our duty and responsibility concepts? Determinism/Strawson: 1. Our normal behaviors, beliefs, sensibilities, and institutions are far too strongly shaped by the usual reactive attitudes and feelings for it to be realistic that a mere theoretical belief in determinism could really change them. Second, in the cases where we actually change our attitudes, any conviction about the truth of determinism does not matter at all. Questions of rational justification belong to other levels and narrower domains than our actual behavior. Schulte III 443 Determinism/Strawson: if it were true, would not change our ingrained attitudes and responses. >Fatalism, >Future, >Behavior._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Schulte I J. Schulte Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001 Schulte II J. Schulte U. J. Wenzel Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001 Schulte III Joachim Schulte "Peter Frederick Strawson" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke, Reinbek 1993 |
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> Counter arguments against Strawson
> Counter arguments in relation to Determinism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19