|Disposition, philosophy: the tendency for a certain behavior that is not yet occurred at the present time. Problem Statements containing dispositional terms, cannot be determined in their truth value, as the relevant event has not yet occurred. In classic logic can even be concluded that a sentence containing a dispositional term will be trivially true as long as the relevant circumstances are not realized. See also dispositional terms, counterfactual conditionals, law statements.|
|Quine, Willard Van Orman
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Disposition: stimulus is not a single event here, but universal. Not two similar, but repetition of the same.
Disposition expressions: assumptions from detailed structure - colors: "red" actually also disposition expression - Irreducible general terms.
Praphraseable only through unreal conditional clauses.
Disposition/Quine: Problem: you can define the conditions so narrowly that every event is unprecedented. Stich: then every action is a congenital disposition - absurd - Quine: then there is no difference between the disposition, behaving this way and the fact of behavior.
Definition Disposition: property of the object, by virtue of which the circumstances cause c to do a. Problem: the "virtue" is inexplicable.
You need a strong link between the dispositions (e.g. water solubility) and its update (e.g. the dissolving when in water).
Ryle: disposition as a basic concept - other authorsVs: Counterfactual Conditional for explanation.
Dispositions/Quine: physical state (Micro Structure) or mechanism - E.g. intelligence.
Problem: dependence on ceteris paribus sentences: elimination of disturbances.
Nerve path itself as disposition.
Solution for ceteris-paribus/Disturbance: ask what pairs of stimuli the person finds most similar.
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953
Bezeichnung und Referenz
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003