Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Disposition, philosophy: the tendency for a certain behavior that is not yet occurred at the present time. Problem Statements containing dispositional terms, cannot be determined in their truth value, as the relevant event has not yet occurred. In classic logic can even be concluded that a sentence containing a dispositional term will be trivially true as long as the relevant circumstances are not realized. See also dispositional terms, counterfactual conditionals, law statements.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Quine, Willard Van Orman
 
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Dispositions I 72
Disposition: stimulus is not a single event here, but universal. Not two similar, but repetition of the same.
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I 386
Disposition expressions: assumptions from detailed structure - colors: "red" actually also disposition expression - Irreducible general terms.
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I 387
Praphraseable only through unreal conditional clauses.
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V 20f
Disposition/Quine: Problem: you can define the conditions so narrowly that every event is unprecedented. Stich: then every action is a congenital disposition - absurd - Quine: then there is no difference between the disposition, behaving this way and the fact of behavior.
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V 23
Definition Disposition: property of the object, by virtue of which the circumstances cause c to do a. Problem: the "virtue" is inexplicable.
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V 24
You need a strong link between the dispositions (e.g. water solubility) and its update (e.g. the dissolving when in water).
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V 25
Ryle: disposition as a basic concept - other authorsVs: Counterfactual Conditional for explanation.
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V 26
Dispositions/Quine: physical state (Micro Structure) or mechanism - E.g. intelligence.
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V 28
Problem: dependence on ceteris paribus sentences: elimination of disturbances.
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V 30
Nerve path itself as disposition.
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V 40
Solution for ceteris-paribus/Disturbance: ask what pairs of stimuli the person finds most similar.

Q I
W.V.O. Quine
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Q II
W.V.O. Quine
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Q III
W.V.O. Quine
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Q IX
W.V.O. Quine
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Q V
W.V.O. Quine
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Q VI
W.V.O. Quine
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Q VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Q VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Q X
W.V.O. Quine
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Q XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003


> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Dispositions



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-26