|Disposition, philosophy: the tendency for a certain behavior that is not yet occurred at the present time. Problem Statements containing dispositional terms, cannot be determined in their truth value, as the relevant event has not yet occurred. In classic logic can even be concluded that a sentence containing a dispositional term will be trivially true as long as the relevant circumstances are not realized. See also dispositional terms, counterfactual conditionals, law statements.|
Books on Amazon:
|Dispositions||Frank I 594
Disposition/realism/RortyVsArmstrong: the realistic conception of dispositions implies that physicalism must be true - then physicalism would be no empirical scientific truth (or theory) anymore.
Frank I 595
Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: the phenomenalist, unlike the realist, cannot explain dispositions ((s) otherwise circular, because dispositions can also only be described) - He cannot explain why counterfactual conditionals are true.
Rorty I 115
Disposition/RortyVsRyle: 1) no necessary (conceptual, linguistic) connection between sensation and disposition as between heat and redness - Rorty: nevertheless, behaviorism is on the track of something right - it makes clear that the question "mental or not mental" becomes pointless.
Dosposition/SellarsVsRyle/RortyVsRyle: his mistake was: proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that there are no internal states in reality - (f.o.th.) - Wittgenstein: (PU § 308) the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things and leave their nature open.
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994