Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Disquotationalism: a variant of the theory of truth that is inspired by Tarski's definition of truth and believes that the two sides of the T-scheme must be taken from the same language, e.g. "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. See also homophony, homophone truth conditions, truth theory, Tarski, assertibility conditions.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Field, Hartry
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Disquotationalism Ad II 105
Definition disquotational/(s): "literal" - Field: heuristic: disquotation means "truth-like-he-understands-it" -/(s) so referring to the speaker - this is not a definition of truth in terms of understanding - merely heuristic - deflationism: this leads to cognitive equivalence - disquotational true/Field: "true, as I understand it".
Purely disquotational true: 1. generalization possible only like this - for example: not every axiom is true - (but one does not yet know which) - 2. - "true-like-I-understand-it" - 3. the concept is use-independent - E.g. to say "Snow is white" is true is the same as to call snow white - no property is attributed which would not have it if one uses the sentence differently - everyday language: here we seem to use a different truth-predicate - Use-independency of the truth-predicate: neccessary for the generalization for infinite conjunctions/disjunctions - contingently true: E.g. Euclidean geometry. The axioms could have been wrong - we do not want to say with this, that the speakers could have used their words differently.
II 123
Disquotational true is unlike Tarski-true.
II 135
Deflationism/Field/(s): contrast: semantic/disquotational: semantic: not simply repeating something literal, but finding truth, depending on the situation E.g. for index words - disquotational: only repeating literally, does not work for indices and demonstrativa.
II 152
Disquotational truth: Problem: untranslatable sentences are not disquotationally true.
II 164
Disquotational true/disquotational reference: corresponds to the thesis that Tarskian truth is not contingently empirical - necessary: both "p" is true iff p" and "it is true that p iff p" because the equality between possible worlds is not defined - always related to the actual world.
II 223
Radical deflationism/narrow: does not allow interpersonal synonymy - only purely disquotational truth - it is about how the listener understands the sentence, not the speaker.
Definition Disquotationalism/Field: the thesis that the question by which facts e.g. "entropy" refers to entropy, is meaningless.
II 261
Non-disquotational view/n.-d.v./indeterminacy/VsDisquotationalism: the non-disquotational view must assume an indeterminacy of our concepts on a substantial level - even for logical constants?
II 269
Disquotational view/truth/Reference/Semantics/Logic/Field: N.B.: Truth and reference are not really semantic concepts here, but logical ones - because they are applied primarily to our idiolect - here they function as logical concepts - (e.g. "true" for generalization) - N.B.: that - "rabbit" refers to rabbits is then a logical truth, not a semantic - then there is still indeterminacy in translation.
II 272
Disquotational view/disquotationalism: for it, the relevant structure of a language is not to be understood in referential terms, but in terms of stimulus meaning, inferential role and indication relation.

Fie I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Fie II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-24