|Quine, Two Dogmas of Empricism:|
1st Dogma distinction analytic/synthetic - 2nd Dogma reductionism. The belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to a logical construction of terms which refer to immediate experience. - Quine, W.V.O. (1951), "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," The Philosophical Review 60, 20–43. Reprinted in his 1953 From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press. See also analytic/synthetic, reduction, reductionism, conceptual schemes, holism. Later D. Davidson discussed a 3rd dogma (separation scheme/content).
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|Two Dogmas||(According to Rorty): I 215 ff
Two Dogmas: the behavioristical treatment of "truth by virtue of meaning" in this paper is actually not interesting (Harman): "the president went to Vietnam" and "Johnson went to Vietnam." I 220
Reference: Quine seems to consider the philosophical reference term to be in contrast to the concept of meaning: I 220
Rorty: if we do without reference, then we can also do without an ontology. Quine would agree to that.
First dogma: "essentialism": the idea that one distinguish between the thing that was talked about earlier, and what was said about it by determining the essence of the issue in question! (Impossible!).
Second dogma: such a translation can always be found, and such analytical statements were formulated at any time that the determination of the meaning of a referring expression is already possible because of very fact it is determined which report of a "neutral observation language" confirms the assertion of existence and which would falsify it.
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