Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Armstrong, D.M.
Books on Amazon
Properties III 12
Properties/Armstrong: are always non-local! (>Chisholm) - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property - relational properties may not be local either! - III 14
Individuation/Individual/ED/Properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties - E.g. "being one light-second away from proton A" - is no prop - but: E.g. "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Distance).
III 83
Properties/Armstrong: strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore not all arbitrary predicates - Pseudo-property: self-identity (not universal) - Identity lends no causal or nomic force.
III 114f
Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st stage relation - if E.g. "to be a mass" isa property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight - VsRealism of Properties: risk of duplication, intermediate elements - Armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass".
III 141
Properties/Armstrong: "property of being a property" not desirable - at least not a second order Humean regularity - but is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws.
III 145
Rather introduce new properties than new laws.
III ~ 163
Properties/Armstrong: if essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme.
II 5
Properties/Armstrong: categorically = non-dispositional - but many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible" - but dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties.
II 96
Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions - it is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side - according to Martin that would be a sluggish world, because there would be no causality -
II 102
MartinVsArmstrong: World does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested - (> 77 II)
II 97
Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: are individuals! - Therefore no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties - instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same" - ArmstrongVs: that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! - ArmstrongVs: pro universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical".
II 168
Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: assuming properties instead of parts - the complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts.

AR II = Disp
D. M. Armstrong

Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996

D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Properties

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-27