|Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness.|
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Properties/Goodman: Many philosophers/Goodman: assert that the intrinsic qualities of a text are different from it, and not included in it, but put it in a relationship with other texts who share these properties with it.
Goodman: The expressed darkness by the image is peculiar to the image . Also a poem that expresses the darkness, is metaphorically dark. (Exemplification)
Definition exemplification/Goodman: possession of properties is no exemplification. It belongs to that the reference of what possesses to the possessed property. It is a kind of referring, but different from denotation (or description or representation).
Properties/Goodman: In order for a work to be a case of "pure art", of "symbol-free", it cannot, according to this view, neither represent something, nor express something. But if we express the thing like that, then of course, all properties that a picture or some other work has - are themselves the property to represent a person or something else - characteristics of the image and not properties of something in the external.
Extrinsic/intrinsic/properties/Goodman: the difference is not working, because every object and each image has both types of properties.
If we abstract from all the features that are responsible for disagreement between truths, we have nothing left but versions without things without facts, without worlds.
Since "property" ("property") is usually closely related with "predicate", I often use the term "feature" ("feature"). This is a reminder that not all labels are linguistic.
It does not matter how essential a property is, but how it relates to the manifest property. The problem of disposition is to define this type of connection.
Arts/Goodman: Since the exercise, training and development of our abilities to distinguish between works of art are visible aesthetic actions, the aesthetic properties of an image not only include those which we find when looking at it, but also those that determine how we should look at it.
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989