Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Putnam, Hilary
 
Books on Amazon
Properties III 177
Properties/LewisVsPutnam: properties must be something simple - if one follows from another, then that would be a necessary relationship between two simple properties. - Putnam: that would be incomprehensible - wrong solution/Lewis: then properties would have to be interpreted as complexes in turn - LewisVs: properties must be simple - from what should they be composed? - PutnamVsLewis: this is not an analytical style - why should something simple not make any relations?
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V 119
Properties/identity/Putnam: synonymy is necessary for identity of predicates, not properties - temperature is not synonymous with molecular motion.
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I 195
Functional property/Putnam: E.g. to have a program is for a computer a functional property instead of a physical - non-functional properties: inputs and outputs - functional properties: are defined by cause and effect.
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I 195
Reference/Lewis: is a functional property - N.B.: that should undermine the distinction physical/non-physical - Reference is then a functional property of the organism-plus-environment system.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


> Counter arguments against Putnam
> Counter arguments in relation to Properties



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29