Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Property: what can be ascribed to an object in order to distinguish it from other objects. In philosophy, there is debate about whether properties exist or whether "bare particulars" exist. Expressions for properties are predicates. Not every predicate will refer to a property. See also quantification over properties, 2nd order logic, HOL, completeness.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Stalnaker, Robert
Books on Amazon
Properties I 9
Def property/Stalnaker: a) thin definition/Economic: a way in which individuals can be grouped - b) richer Def/Stalnaker: (more robust) something in relation to which the individuals are grouped. To do this, we identify intrinsic properties with regions of a property-space - Important argument: since the elements of the sets are not identical with the individuals that instantiate the property, this represents the independence of properties from their instantiation - ((s) So Stalnaker believes that properties also exist if they are not instantiated).
I 75
Modal Logic/ML/Semantics/Extensional/Stalnaker: E.g. property: is represented as a singular propositional function (PF) which takes an individual as an argument and delivers a proposition as a value - equivalent to this: property: a function that takes a possible world as an argument and delivers a set of individuals as a value. - It is therefore intuitively a selection rule for a class of individuals, given the facts - and vice versa: a selection selective procedure for a class of individuals is a property of the selected individuals. - Problem: there is no extensional equivalent to the distinction between referential and purely qualitative properties - unlike with the distinction between essential and accidental ones. - Referential properties: are defined in terms of the individuals that they have - wrong solution: to stipulate that only accidental prop may be selected for atomic predicates - this does not prevent that essential attributions could be true - it prevents only that they can be expressed - Anti-essentialism/Solution: the property must be defined independently of the possible worlds and the individuals.
I 78
Intrinsic Property/Bare particular- theory: to identify intrinsic property we must distinguish possible world-indexed, time-indexed and referential properties from them - these do not correspond to any particular regions in the logical space -" E.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth - this is how we can represent anti-essentialism.
I 79
Kripke early: Babe Ruth could have been a billiard ball - later: there is a fallacy in that. - Stalnaker: one cannot assume that he is actually a billiard ball, because then one could not refer to him as one already did. - That’s not what it is about (see below). - This confuses the limits of what could actually be with the limitations of assumptions about what could counterfactually have been.
I 79
Essential Property/Kripke/Stalnaker: E.g. Kripke: Thesis: names for natural species (natural kind terms) express essential properties. - Names for species are referential terms. - Referential: determined by a causal connection. - Natural kinds: not purely linguistic, but restricting the movement in the logical space. - Bare particulars: if one allows Babe Ruth to be a billiard ball, then one must also allow it for any other thing - then uninteresting.
I 81
Property/Narrow/wide/propositional function: the distinction between - 1) narrow P - and 2) Propositional functions: a propositional function in general is analogous to the distinction between possible individuals and concepts of individual in general.
I 94f
Physical non-property: complex combinations of physical properties and relations (see below, E.g. golden mountain). - Strong supervenience/Stalnaker: allows complex (composite) physical attributes to be physical properties - attribute: easy way of picking out.
I 103
Def Property/Stalnaker: properties are simply a way to group individuals - basic property/Stalnaker: must provide distinctions between individuals that could otherwise not be explained - problem: then basic properties cannot supervene on something else.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-30