Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Introduction, philosophy: the introduction of objects establishes rules for the use of linguistic expressions for the objects, not a determination or description of these objects. See also definitions, use, language, expressiveness, localization.
 
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Strawson, Peter F.
 
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Introduction I 187
Term/expression/thing/introducing/Strawson: everything what is introduced by an expression in an uterance is a thing (Term: StrawsonVsQuine: here also non-linguistical, thing).
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I 188
VsGeach: does not distinguish between the various types of introduction to the speech - one can say, a statement says something about every thing that is inserted into it, not only about the things that have been introduced in a referring manner - (also on smoking) - "is wise" is purportedly introduced, Socrates not.
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I 192
But still no difference between assertive and facts-introductory mode, because the latter is also predicating.
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I 193
Assertive mode primary.
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I 194
Introduction: indicative verbal form: introduces thing in a statement - substantive: has no such implication can also introduce lists of things - VsFrege: is determined that terms cannot only be introduced non-substantively - hence the paradox that "is wise" is an object, not a term - (not introduced in the assertive mode).
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I 196
StrawsonVsFrege: that the parts of the sentence only stick together by unsaturated is merely metaphorical - RamseyVsFrege: no reason to consider any part as unsaturated.
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I 232ff
Particular/Introduction: by identifying description - so that speakers and hearers mean the same particular.
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I 234
Introductory description must not specify texture: E.g. the city in which I lived - but true empirical statement.
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I 235
For universals nothing corresponding.
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I 236
But no facts about the world but about the language - (s) no truth maker.
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I 238
When U introduced into language, no empirical certainty of truth of sentences needed.
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I 239
Special case: if universal is not introduced through expression but through description, then confirmation trough empirical sentence necessary. - E.g. instead of "flu": "John's Disease".
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I 239f
U/particular/introduction: Class (1): (universal): expressions of which one (without empirical facts) cannot know what they introduce - class (2) (paricular) also without empirical fact possible to know what they introduce - both are incomplete - (1) presuppose implicit expressions, have factual weight - (2) have no factual weight.
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I 241
Subject/predicate/thing/particular/U: 3. criterion: expressions introducing particulars can never be predicate expressions - Definition subject-expression: presents a fact by itself (complete) - predicate A: incomplete "is married to John" is not a fact by itself.
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I 242
E.g. "generosity is a more amiable virtue than intelligence" - "generosity" and "intelligence" do not present a covert joint fact.
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I 242
General/individual: the affinity between the grammatical and the categorical criterion for subject/predicate distinction explains also the traditional concatenation of the two distinctions.
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I 254ff
Introduction/particular: so far only quasi as quantification according to an empirical condition - new: other sense of introducing: introduction of practice, to introduce particular in the 1st sense - then also E1: introduces particular, E2: classes of particulars - then prerequisite2 V2: class of things (or universal) which can be introduced - where is then the asymmetry between particular and universal?
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I 258
Connection of the two theories: an EF1 of a particular of the relevant class, we can think in such a way that it is a fact of the v2 class v1.
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I 263
Both theories independ, but connectable.
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I 259
Particular/Introduction: sentences in which certain types of particulars are introduced, cannot be traced back to those in which they do not occur - E.g. statements about Nations cannot be traced back in statements via people - but they have statements about people as a prerequisite2 - Problem: What is at the end of the chain? -> Feature-universals.

Str I
P.F. Strawson
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Str IV
P.F. Strawson
Analyse und Metaphysik M√ľnchen 1994

Str V
P.F. Strawson
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28