Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

One, number 1: in modern logic it is not possible to introduce the number one directly. It must be introduced indirectly, via existential quantification ("for at least one x ...") and universal quantification ("for all x ..."). In addition, identity is needed. See also definition, identity, logic, elementary logic, number theory, numbers.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Lewis, David
Books on Amazon
One (Number 1) IV 218
"One"/Medieval/"Existentially generic"/Lewis: E.g. If one pig is male, one is female, then "a pig" is both male and female at the same time - "universally generic": only has the properties that each x has - i.e. neither male nor female ... - solution/Lewis: character: set of properties of a thing - generic pigs cannot exist, but their characters can - individual character: maximum compatible set of properties, so that one thing could have all and only these particular properties - otherwise it is a generic character - Mates: eliminates things in general in favor of "clusters of properties" - then extension for NP: characters are individual or generic - for general terms sets of individual characters - name/Lewis: is an NP that never has a generic character as an extension to any index.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29