Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Particular, individual thing, philosophy: this is about the problems associated with the introduction of linguistic expressions for objects that can be specified as individuals. See also individuation, objects, thing, identification, specification, singular terms, general term, universals.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Stalnaker, Robert
Books on Amazon
Particulars I 72
Bare Particular/Anti-Essentialism/BIT/Stalnaker: thesis: for every individual and every property there are possible worlds in which the individual has this property, and other possible world in which it doesn’t - exceptions: self-identity - Problem: we need special semantics for that.
I 72/73
Essential Properties/Bare Individual Things/Theoretical Terms/Particulars/Stalnaker: from the perspective of the theory of the bare IT there are undeniable essential properties - 1) something that is necessarily an essential property of everything - E.g. the ability to be self-identical - E.g. to be either a kangaroo or not a kangaroo, E.g. to be colored when red - 2) Def referential properties/Ruth Marcus: (1967) the following attributes are essential for Babe Ruth: - E.g. being identical with Babe Ruth, E.g. either being identical with Babe Ruth or fat, E.g. being fat when Babe Ruth is fat, E.g. having the same weight as Babe Ruth - also applies in possible worlds where BR is a tricycle - 3) possible worlds-indexed properties/Plantinga: (1970) are undeniable essential properties - E.g. call the real world Kronos - then being-snub-nosed-in-Kronos is defined as the property that something has in any possible world if. it has the normal accidental property to be snub-nosed in Kronos (actual world) - Important argument: this imposes no restrictions on an individual as to which properties it could have had.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28