|Particular, individual thing, philosophy: this is about the problems associated with the introduction of linguistic expressions for objects that can be specified as individuals. See also individuation, objects, thing, identification, specification, singular terms, general term, universals.|
|Strawson, Peter F.
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|Particulars||Graeser I 163
Particulars/Strawson: Particulars have priority in our conceptual system - ability to attribute consciousness to predicates necessary. Condition for them for physical predicates.
Graeser I 224
Strawson: These particulars take precedence of processes or events that we could not identify without them.
Newen/Schrenk I 150
VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: why should just particulars be the most fundamental reference objects of subject terms and not events? - Strawson: because objects are recognizable after some time - his arguments are transcendental.
Strawson I 35 ~
Particular/Strawson: as long as it is isolated from the rest of the knowledge, we can learn nothing new about it.
Particular/Strawson: is there a class of particular on which all others depend? - Maybe dependent "private particular" - Elementary: Class of People - Tradition: private particular: "Emotions" fundamental.
Principium indivduationis/Strawson: is based on identity of persons.
Particular/Strawson: material bodies: fundamental for the identification - not for process - StrawsonVsRussell: not biography instead of the names.
Description of particular does not force to mention the process - but identification dependency of processes of the particulars in which they take place - because things require space, processes not always.
Particular/properties/Strawson: one cannot only refer identifying to particulars - VsTradition: therefore object character is not a criterion for particulars.
I 176 RamseyVs
Particular/properties/RamseyVsTradition: from the fact that two things are linked, it does not follow that they must have different characters - Strawson:> 1. grammatical criterion for distinguishing between things and activities - 2. categorical criterion.
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002