Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Sensation: ability to detect differences between own inner states related to stimuli. Sensations are fundamentally for perceptions and unlike them not linked to linguistic abilities. See also sensory impression, impression, perception, stimulation, stimuli, emotion, experience.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Sellars, Wilfrid
Books on Amazon
Sensations I XIIf
Sensation/Sellars: is not passive.
I 9
Sensation/Sellars: can be acquired through learning (symbols) - also factual knowledge - Conclusion (RyleVs) is irrelevant - neither epistemically nor physically - not to be equated with thoughts.
I 46
Sensation/Sellars: No idea - Learning: is activity - Experience: object.
I 77
Inner episodes: Ryle: Category error - SellarsVsRyle: sensations as inner episodes are not an error but with other inner episodes (thoughts) intersubjectively explainable.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-29