|Sensation: ability to detect differences between own inner states related to stimuli. Sensations are fundamentally for perceptions and unlike them not linked to linguistic abilities. See also sensory impression, impression, perception, stimulation, stimuli, emotion, experience.|
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|Sensations||Rorty I 128
Wittgenstein: sensations would have some half of an existence between nothingness and something, they would "fell out" of the world like the beetle in the box.
Wittgenstein: sensation "not something, but also not nothing. The result was that a nothing would do the same services as the something about what cannot be stated." (Philosophical Investigations § 304.)
RortyVsWittgenstein: confusion of the concept of incorrigibility with the notion of incommunicability.
Rorty VI 147
Sensation/Wittgenstein: Feeling alone (without language) is not enough.
Dummett I 35
WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, for the
subject itself unrecognizable.
Wittgenstein VI 118
Sensation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: a sentence about the sensations, because it completely remains at the level of linguistics, is outside the true/false dimension.
Sensation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: has no object.
Expression: is not description (but more direct).
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982