Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Epiphenomenalism, philosophy of mind: theories that conceive the mind as a side effect of brain processes, the mind itself does not cause any effects. See also supervenience, identity theory, mind, brain, materialism, reductionism, dualism, property dualism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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M. Pauen on Epiphenomenalism - Dictionary of Arguments
Pauen I 65 Epiphenomenalism/Th.h.Huxley: no gap argument (Continuity argument): since there is no gap in the sequence of physical processes consciousness can not be effective. >Consciousness, >Effect, >Causality, >Continuity, >Th. H. Huxley. I 69 Epiphenomenalism/PopperVsepiphenomenalism: theory of evolution: without effect would have the consciousness no selective advantage. >Selection, >Evolution, >Benefit. PauenVsEpiphenomenalism: E.g. If pain and experience of happiness were causally undistinguished, we could not distinguish them in memory and behavior. >Pain, >Memory, >Behavior._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
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> Counter arguments against Pauen
> Counter arguments in relation to Epiphenomenalism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18