Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Experience: a) reflected perception, which can be compared with prior perceptions and can be processed linguistically. See also events, perception, sensations, empiricism.
b) an event that is processed in the consciousness of a subject. No mere imagination. See also events, imagination, consciousness.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Sellars, Wilfrid
 
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Experience McDowell I 163
Experience/Sellars/McDowell: not without concepts that play a role in the system of beliefs. What we regard as the message of experience, is already a part and no external constraint of the system.
Experience/experience history/Sellars: not the result of impressions, but of phenomena.
Phenomena conceptually (in order to establish them in a rational relationship to beliefs).
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I XXXVIII
Three possible experiences:
1. this is a red object,
2. the object appears to be red (maybe white in red light).
3. It looks like it would be an object. (Also hallucination).
One might assume that they cherish the same thought in all three cases, but obtain a new setting every time towards this thought. (Reductive-materialistic, Armstrong, Dennett).
Ambiguity: en/ung experience, activities, non-descriptive content - experience object.
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I 44
Fact: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.)
But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing.
Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience.
Experience: we need a name for the experience, which is not only an abbreviation for a description. Does the everyday language have such names?
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I 44
Experience/Sellars: Ambiguity: en/ung experiencing: activity, non-descriptive content - experience object: the fact that something over there this seems to be red, is not experiencing - "however: the common descriptive core can be an experiencing - facts: are experienced, but are not an experiencing- and no experience.
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I 45
Experience/Sellars: Problem: sensation always seems to presuppose an object - possible solution: should we align sensations and propositional attitudes? - "Vs: this is the approximation leading to Locke/Descartes - Descartes/Locke: sensations on a stage with ideas -" SellarsVs.

Sell I
W. Sellars
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

MD I
J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-26