Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Satisfaction, logic: a formula is satisfied when their variables are interpreted in a way that the formula as a whole is a true statement. The interpretation is a substitution of the variables of the formula by appropriate constants (e.g. names). When the interpreted formula is true, we call it a model. See also satisfiability, models, model theory.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Kripke, Saul Aaron
Books on Amazon
Satisfaction I 35
Description is satisfied: an object is the only one to satisfy the description (e.g. champagne).
I 123
It is generally not the case that the reference of a name is determined by identification of the specific characteristics, certain properties that are only satisfied by the reference and of which the speaker knows or believes that they are true.
EMD II 374
Satisfaction conditions: must be understood in order to understand open sentences - therefore intentions incomprehensible in open sentences - Definition satisfaction/Kripke (m referential variables.): "(Exi) Rabbit(xi)" iff there is an s" that differs at most from s at the i-th point that satisfies "Rabbit (xi)" - satisfaction> open sentence> intention.
EMD II 380
Definition satisfaction/Kripke: "(Exi) rabbit (xi)" iff there is an s" that differs at most from s at the i-th point that satisfies "Rabbit (xi)" - (purely formal).
EMD II 393
Truth/Satisfaction/Definability: truth can only be definable in a metalanguage (for a given referential object language), but satisfaction not because the corresponding ontology cannot be reached in the meta language - e.g. the set of true sentences will be definable in different metalanguages whose ontology is that of the integers (e.g. metalanguage assumes the truth for the object language as a simple predicate) - satisfaction: will not be definable unless the ontology of the object language happens to be one of integers.
EMD II 403
Satisfaction: Relation between expressions and other objects: > denotation.

S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

> Counter arguments against Kripke

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-28