Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Satisfaction, logic: a formula is satisfied when their variables are interpreted in a way that the formula as a whole is a true statement. The interpretation is a substitution of the variables of the formula by appropriate constants (e.g. names). When the interpreted formula is true, we call it a model. See also satisfiability, models, model theory.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Kripke, Saul Aaron
 
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Satisfaction I 35
Description is satisfied: an object is the only one to satisfy the description (e.g. champagne).
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I 123
It is generally not the case that the reference of a name is determined by identification of the specific characteristics, certain properties that are only satisfied by the reference and of which the speaker knows or believes that they are true.
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EMD II 374
Satisfaction conditions: must be understood in order to understand open sentences - therefore intentions incomprehensible in open sentences - Definition satisfaction/Kripke (m referential variables.): "(Exi) Rabbit(xi)" iff there is an s" that differs at most from s at the i-th point that satisfies "Rabbit (xi)" - satisfaction> open sentence> intention.
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EMD II 380
Definition satisfaction/Kripke: "(Exi) rabbit (xi)" iff there is an s" that differs at most from s at the i-th point that satisfies "Rabbit (xi)" - (purely formal).
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EMD II 393
Truth/Satisfaction/Definability: truth can only be definable in a metalanguage (for a given referential object language), but satisfaction not because the corresponding ontology cannot be reached in the meta language - e.g. the set of true sentences will be definable in different metalanguages whose ontology is that of the integers (e.g. metalanguage assumes the truth for the object language as a simple predicate) - satisfaction: will not be definable unless the ontology of the object language happens to be one of integers.
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EMD II 403
Satisfaction: Relation between expressions and other objects: > denotation.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


> Counter arguments against Kripke



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-24