## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Satisfaction, logic: a formula is satisfied when their variables are interpreted in a way that the formula as a whole is a true statement. The interpretation is a substitution of the variables of the formula by appropriate constants (e.g. names). When the interpreted formula is true, we call it a model. See also satisfiability, models, model theory. | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
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Kripke, Saul Aaron Books on Amazon |
Satisfaction | I 35 Description is satisfied: an object is the only one to satisfy the description (e.g. champagne). --- I 123 It is generally not the case that the reference of a name is determined by identification of the specific characteristics, certain properties that are only satisfied by the reference and of which the speaker knows or believes that they are true. --- EMD II 374 Satisfaction conditions: must be understood in order to understand open sentences - therefore intentions incomprehensible in open sentences - Definition satisfaction/Kripke (m referential variables.): "(Exi) Rabbit(xi)" iff there is an s" that differs at most from s at the i-th point that satisfies "Rabbit (xi)" - satisfaction> open sentence> intention. --- EMD II 380 Definition satisfaction/Kripke: "(Exi) rabbit (xi)" iff there is an s" that differs at most from s at the i-th point that satisfies "Rabbit (xi)" - (purely formal). --- EMD II 393 Truth/Satisfaction/Definability: truth can only be definable in a metalanguage (for a given referential object language), but satisfaction not because the corresponding ontology cannot be reached in the meta language - e.g. the set of true sentences will be definable in different metalanguages whose ontology is that of the integers (e.g. metalanguage assumes the truth for the object language as a simple predicate) - satisfaction: will not be definable unless the ontology of the object language happens to be one of integers. --- EMD II 403 Satisfaction: Relation between expressions and other objects: > denotation. |
K I S.A. Kripke Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 K III S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) InRecent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Ev I G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |

> Counter arguments against **Kripke**

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-24