|Satisfaction, logic: a formula is satisfied when their variables are interpreted in a way that the formula as a whole is a true statement. The interpretation is a substitution of the variables of the formula by appropriate constants (e.g. names). When the interpreted formula is true, we call it a model. See also satisfiability, models, model theory.|
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Satisfaction/Tarski: is the terminus for reference. - Putnam: relation between words and things, more precisely, between formulas and finite sequences of things. - Tarski; "The sequence of length one only existing of x, satisfies the formula "electron (y)" iff x is an electron". - The sequence Abraham: Isaac meets the formula "x is the father of y". - If there are more binary relations one does not speak of Reference. -> Correspondence theory -> picture theory - Putnam: Tarski's theory is not suitable for the correspondence theory because satisfaction is explained by a list. - (Instead> meaning postulates: "electron" refers to electrons, etc.) - "true" is the zero digit case of fulfillment: a formula is true if it has no free variables and if it meets the zero sequence.
Zero digit relation: E.g. Tarski: "true" is the zero digit case of satisfaction: that means, a formula is true if it has no free variables and if the zero sequence is met. - Zero sequence: converges to 0. Example 1;, 1/4, 1/9, 1/16, ...
Satisfaction/Putnam: criterion T can be extended to the criterion E: (E) an adequate definition of fulfilled-in-S must generate all instances of the following scheme as theorems: "P(x1 ... xn) is only fulfilled by the sequence y1. ..yn when P (y1 .... yn) - reformulated: "electron (x)" is then and only then fulfilled by y1 when y1 is an electron - This is determined by truth and reference (not determined by provability) and is therefore even preserved in intuitionistic interpretation. PutnamVsField: his objection fails: for the realists the Tarski schema is correct - FieldVsTarski: similar to a "definition" of chemical valence by enumeration of all elements and their valence. The causal involvement in our explanations is lacking - PutnamVsField: truth and reference are not causally explanatory terms, we still need them for formal logic, even if scientific theories are wrong.
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990