Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
| |||
Explanation: making a statement in relation to an event, a state, a change or an action that was described before by a deviating statement. The statement will often try to involve circumstances, history, logical premises, causes and causality. See also description, statements, theories, understanding, literal truth, best explanation, causality, cause, completeness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
---|---|---|---|
D. Davidson on Explanation - Dictionary of Arguments
Glüer II 99 ff Explaining means re-describing. Thesis: explanations of action can be interpreted as singular causal statements. That is, in contrast to the "logical-connection-thesis" as statements about two distinct events. Caution: It is true that explanations of action do not allow an independent description of the cause, but it is precisely the description of the cause for which this is true, not the cause itself. >Causes, >Reasons, >Reason/Cause, >Motives, >Description/Davidson. Glüer II 112f Explanation of Action/DavidsonVsAristotle: the practical syllogism cannot deal with divergent causal chains (mountaineer-example), and also not with a mere intention (omission, intermittent event), and weakness of will. >Weakness of will. Glüer II 114 Intention/Davidson: Form: Judgment: "x is executable." Weak will/Acrasia/Davidson: irrational judgment - solution: separate action and intention. Glüer II 115 "All things-considered"-judgement: is only possible for omniscient beings. Glüer II 138 Explanation of action/mental/physical/DavidsonVsReductionism: intentionalistic vocabulary is in principle irreducible. There are no strict laws for the prediction of actions. - >Anomalous monism. - - - Horwich I 456 Truth/Explanation/Davidson/Rorty: is not an explanation for something - ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a proposition that asserts it is true). - also the existence of truth needs no explanation. Wrong: e.g. "he did not find the house because his beliefs about its location were wrong". Correct: (without truth): "He believed that it was located ---". Explanation: details of what was true or false, not the truth itself - If truth itself was an explanation, it would have to be a cause for something. Explanation: not "he did the right thing", but the circumstances. "Truth" as explanation would be like tertia (e.g. "intended interpretation", "conceptual scheme"). It is an idle wheel. - Putnam ditto. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |