|Ersatz world, philosophy: expression from David Lewis for possible worlds which consist only of sets of sentences, as opposed to worlds (different from our actual world) that are really existing. Other authors such as S. A. Kripke believe, unlike D. Lewis, that possible worlds do not really exist but are only construed for theoretical reasons. See also ersatzism, modal realism, possible worlds, metaphysics, necessity, essentialism, telescope theory.|
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|Ersatz Worlds||I 226
Ersatz worlds resp. "Ersatz individuals"/Field: i.e. in Stalnaker's way of speaking: - "To show how the world could be or could have been". That is, maximally determined properties that an individual might or might have had in the universe. - This can be used to define cross-world congruence. - Then "Ersatz matter particles" are properties! - Then "congruent" and "between" are higher-order predicates that are applied to properties - Whereby xP is also an ersatz particle, one that is instantiated in the real world by the normal particle x. - x is a normal particle, but the "ersatz particle" that corresponds to it, and by which conge and bete are defined (see above), is a property, a "way like x could be" and actually a way how x is up to date. - ((s) Ersatz-individual: here not particular but property, "way" (> Lewis)!) - Field: but this does not help relativism (the thesis that empty space is possible) either.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980