|Appearance, Philosophy: Apart from logical insights we receive all our insights through our senses. Therefore, it is believed that this knowledge is not only fundamentally fallible, but is more or less pre-structured by the nature of the sense organs. This structure is not necessarily so in the world outside the perceiving subjects. Because of the linguistic prestructuring of our approach to ourselves the inner life of the subjects is also not unfailingly recognizable. See also appearance, truth, certainty, knowledge, epistemology, introspection, incorrigibility.|
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Form/appearance/BrandomVsPhenomenalism: "it looks as if" just holds back approval.
Error: Understanding appearance as a cognitive act, about which one cannot be wrong - otherwise the mind would consist of infallible representations - Solution: errors and failure are not applicable here - approval that cannot be given cannot be held back - also error: attempt as an act that (as such) cannot fail.
Appearance/Phenomenalism: goes beyond supervenience: > Reductionism: perceptual conditions can only be formulated in terms of the way things are - E.g. Something cannot just appear to seem to be red without really seeming to be red. E.g. you can try to lift a weight, without actually lifting it, but you cannot just attempt to try it without really trying.
Form/appearance/Sellars: two uses: 1. E.g. the chicken seems to have a certain number of spots, but there is no specific number, which it seems to have - 2. Distinction between
a) it looks as if there is a tree
b) there is something that looks like a tree
c) over there is a tree
Understanding/Brandom: here, it "seems to be red" requires it "to be red" - Appearance: not iterable (Try: dito).
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001