Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Mention philosophy: the mention of linguistic objects must be distinguished from their use. This distinction is sometimes difficult when symbols are partly used and partly mentioned within logical formulas. One simple case of a mention of a word or phrase is the quote. See also object language, metalanguage, quote, reference, occurrence, type, token.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Wessel, Horst
Books on Amazon
Mentioning I 220
Use/mention/Wessel: the statement "a and b are identical" is not about the terms "a" and "b", but about the objects they designate - that is, the terms "a" and "b" are used and not mentioned - (s) if the terms were mentioned, one would talk about the terms and not about the objects.
I 286
Use/mention: logical follow-up relationship: A I- B: talks about statements (i.e. not content) - Conditional: A -> B: talking about the content which is talked about in the statements (e.g. current, magnetic field) - Question/(s): mention is = if it is not talked about statements content-related? - Use: = if e.g. the truth is found? - But: "A is true" - does not mean "the current flows".
I 313
Use/mention/Wessel/(s): E.g. "The Inselsberg is referred to by the term Inselsberg": 1. incident used as a term, and designates the object, 2. the word is not used here as a term, but mentioned as a physical object - Berg: mention, name: used - mention: = quote (quotes) - instead of quotation marks: t: t A: name of statement A - "the statement A".
I 352
Incident/mention/use/Wessel: 1. Term or statement A occurs as a term or statement in: E.g. ~ A or A and B - 2. merely as a physical thing (darkness, sound) in E.g. "the statement A" (tA), or "the facts that A" (sA) - E.g. from "Ließchen says a" (only graphically A) and A ↔ B does not follow "Ließchen says B" - therefore it always needs to be defined what must be regarded as incident of a term - (s) density cannot be true or false.
A propos I 352
Mention/use/density/Wessel/(s): different density of the pages: just plays no role in 2 + 2 = 4.
I 35
"Odd"/Frege: occurrence as merely graphical part - Extensionality rule: statements can be replaced by identical ones in meaning, but not any graphical parts - Wessel: here not applicable - Because intensional rules allow very similar to extensional, but sometimes replacing of graphical parts by genuine statements.
I 353
Planets/Wessel: Quine does not differentiate between graphic and genuine occurrence only identity sentences evening star = morning star, number of planets = 9 and then substitutability for identities. - WesselVsQuine: See them as compound expressions: then evening star unequal morning star, as simple equal (for Venus).

We I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29