Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Essentialism: the view that objects have some of their properties necessarily. See also essence, necessity de re, necessity, contingency, properties, actualism, possible worlds.
 
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Cresswell, M.J.
 
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Essentialism I 58
Essentialism/Terence Parsons/Cresswell: the doctrine that some things necessarily have a property that other things do not necessarily have - ParssonsVs: an essentialist theorem is false in a maximum model - and there is a maximum model for each consistent set of closed nonmodal formulas - i.e. that no physical theory contains essentialism in relation to its predicates. Problem: if we restrict the intended model by means other than axioms, it is not clear whether we can avoid essentialism.
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I 59
Essentialism/necessity/possibility/Cresswell: comes through via the language that we build on the language of physics - physics only provides the entities that we need for the semantics of their language - the essentialism does not need to touch the question of the adequacy of a theory as complete framework of a physical description of the world.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-29