Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
Essentialism: the view that objects have some of their properties necessarily. See also essence, necessity de re, necessity, contingency, properties, actualism, possible worlds.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Stalnaker, Robert
 
Books on Amazon
Essentialism I 71
Essentialism/Today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today accept essentialism - QuineVsEssentialism: incorrect: to say that one description is better than the other, because it better characterizes essential properties of an object.
I 72
Essence/Essentialism/Essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: Thesis: every property of every individual constitutes its essence and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent -
I 74
Anti-essentialism/quantified modal logic/Stalnaker/conclusion: in order to connect the two, we need real semantic conditions for atomic predicates - reason: (Ex)N(Fx) > (x)N(Fx). Is a theorem, but not its substitution instance (Ex)N(Rxy) > (x)N(Rxy). - (if something necessarily is father of x, then everything is necessarily father of x - Of course, only intrinsic predicates are in question, but this is assumed and not explained.
I 85
Essentialism/Stalnaker: questions about it are questions about how far it is appropriate and possible to abstract.

Sta I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003


> Counter arguments against Stalnaker
> Counter arguments in relation to Essentialism



back to list view | > Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-03-30