|Existential generalization, logic: if an object that can be named, has a certain property, then there is at least one object with this property. See also universal generalization, universal instantiation.|
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|Existential Generalization||EMD II 302
Existential Generalization/Wiggins: Modal logicVs Existential generalization: E.g. "Cicero is necessarily a human being" as "N Cicero is a human": if we do not differentiate de re and de dicto here, then (Human(Cicero)) l- English (Ex)(Human x). (I- provable) - because Cicero is a name with secured sense - problem: if Cicero is a human, then there are humans - that is, the context "---" must apply to any possible world(wrong) - then there is something that is necessarily a human - N((x)[(x = Cicero)>(x is a human)]) does not help, if the reason is the secured reference of the name, then the existence follows from the English meaning of the sentence (undesirable) - solution/Wiggins: we should distinguish de re/de dicto from the reach of "necessary" itself.
Existential Generalization/Wiggins : ok for well-defined names - Existential generalization does not apply in any context of the form N (---a---) except for numbers.
Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989