Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Extensionality, philosophy: (also extensionality principle, extensionality thesis) an attempt to make the language distinct by taking complete sets of denoted objects as the meaning of the referring words. See also extensions, intensions, extensional language, ambiguity, propositional attitudes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
J. Fodor on Extensionality - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 62 Def extensionality problem/Fodor/Lepore: the extensionality problem describes the problem that a meaning theory cannot only be postulated from the set of truth sentences of a truth theory, as extensional adequacy is not enough (problem: the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green"). Solution: there must be material instead of extensional adequacy, >Translation). Problem: what is a "translation"? IV 63 Truth theory must be able to recognize the truth conditions so that the left side interprets the right one. There is also a problem with compositionality: from the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" arise false truth conditions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
||
> Counter arguments against Fodor
> Counter arguments in relation to Extensionality
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18