Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Colours: in philosophy among other things, the question of how individual > sensory impressions can be generalized or objectified. See also qualities, qualia, perception, inverted spectra, private language.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
Dummett, Michael
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Colour I 64
The fact that the object appears to be red in the red light is something as objective as the fact that it is white.
I 64
"Red" refers not only to a physical property, but also to a perceptible property (it appears as red to people with normal eye sight). If we have explained "appears to be red" with "is red", however, we are no longer able to do it the other way around.
I 64
Color concepts are more objective than, for example, "amusing".
I 67
E.g. You don't need to know the concept "interesting" in order to find something interesting - but to perceive something as red you need to know the concept "red".
I 69
The child does not recognize the colors because of something, it just recognizes them. The meaning of the color words is completely immersed in the ability to recognize them which the child has acquired. In its opinion, the colors are nothing more than features.
Colors: have no features, they are features.
I 70
Colors are not perceptible properties because they are recognizable by means of recognizable sense data (features), but because in the last instance our color concepts are based on an ability acquired through training to recognize colors by looking at them.
I 72
Philosophers who deny that there are colors in the outer reality make a double mistake. They confuse strong objectivity with reality and do not distinguish between meaning and reference.

Du I
M. Dummett
Urspr√ľnge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-28