Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Colours: in philosophy, the problem of coulour is, among other things, the question of how individual sensory impressions can be generalized or objectified. See also qualities, qualia, perception, inverted spectra, private language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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M. Dummett on Colour - Dictionary of Arguments
I 64 The fact that the object appears to be red in the red light is something as objective as the fact that it is white. >Appearance. I 64 "Red" refers not only to a physical property, but also to a perceptible property (it appears as red to people with normal eye sight). If we have explained "appears to be red" with "is red", however, we are no longer able to do it the other way around. I 64 Color concepts are more objective than, for example, "amusing". I 67 E.g. You don't need to know the concept "interesting" in order to find something interesting - but to perceive something as red you need to know the concept "red". I 69 The child does not recognize the colors because of something, it just recognizes them. The meaning of the color words is completely immersed in the ability to recognize them which the child has acquired. In its opinion, the colors are nothing more than features. Colors: have no features, they are features. I 70 Colors are not perceptible properties because they are recognizable by means of recognizable sense data (features), but because in the last instance our color concepts are based on an ability acquired through training to recognize colors by looking at them. I 72 Philosophers who deny that there are colors in the outer reality make a double mistake. They confuse strong objectivity with reality and do not distinguish between meaning and reference. >Meaning, >Reference, >Nature, >Reality, >Perception, >Objectivity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20