Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Colours: in philosophy among other things, the question of how individual > sensory impressions can be generalized or objectified. See also qualities, qualia, perception, inverted spectra, private language.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data
McDowell, John
Books on Amazon
Colour I 82 f
Colors/McDowell: If the recognition of shades of color is conceptual, then we probably do not have the concepts before the color experience, but if we have the concept of a shade of color, then our conceptual potential is sufficient to capture our color experience in all its detail.
I 83
Why should recognition not be conceptual?
Fine graininess: here, the demonstrative expressions certainly play a special role. But why should they be less rationally integrated into spontaneity? (>pointing, indicating).
I 202
Ability to distinguish: in connection with shades of color it is a permanent ability of the subject. The experience gives this potential relevance.
Color/Wittgenstein: there are no "stored classifications". No psychological machinery.
I 203
Color/McDowell: our ability to apply the concept of shade is not based on a comparison with a stored pattern.

J. McDowell
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

> Counter arguments against McDowell

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX file
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-04-25