|Colours: in philosophy among other things, the question of how individual > sensory impressions can be generalized or objectified. See also qualities, qualia, perception, inverted spectra, private language.|
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|Colour||Hintikka I 117
Color/Color Words/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: red cannot be defined.
Color/Color Words/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: if colors were only represented by different names, that would be all the incompatibility - (no contradiction, no logical incompatibility) - on the other hand: if it is real functions that the points in the field of vision project on the color space (Wittgenstein pro), then real logical incompatibility - "red" and "green" as mere names are not contradictory - but they are when it comes to one single point - "(form of thought: Third) - (Hintikka: not explicit in Wittgenstein).
Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "The "colors" are not things that have certain properties so that you could easily look for colors or imagine colors that we do not know yet."
Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein does not want to let the differences between the individual experience of colors disappear -" On the contrary: public language must adapt to the nature of these experiences.
It is not about "publicly used", but about "accessible for the public" - E.g. Robinson: must behave in a certain way for us to say that he plays a language game with himself.
Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is impossible to drive a wedge between physical and phenomenological color attribution...
...nor between pain and pain behavior.
Color/Color Words/Color Concepts/Color Theory/Experience/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: at the end, we may delete the color experiences from our statements.
The experiences, however, can be deleted just as little as pain - Color experience is, however, not about spontaneous expressions like sensations - WittgensteinVsPsychological Color Theories - VsEffect Theories of color - color tables are neither linguistically nor behavioristically bound.
But our color words are not based on tables - (that would be like trying to put the rules above the language game)...
...nor on memories.
Because of their privacy, our notions cannot be used in public language games.
Solution: people simply follow certain language games - this is conceptual, not psychological - in the case of "red" we choose the image that comes to us while listening - (Philosophical Investigations/PI).
Color/Color Words/Impression/Expression/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: We live in a world of impressions - (E.g. color impressions) - but we can only speak of them with reference to physical colors - Representation (Philosophical Investigations/PI § 280): if the painter gives a representation in addition to the image, by what right do we call both a representation?
Although colors have a clearer structure than feelings, there is no essential difference between sensation concepts and color concepts.
Colors/Color Words/Psychology/Wittgenstein: the fact that we can speak of greenish blue, but not of greenish red, is part of grammar - not psychology - Therefore, the entire color octahedron is not part of psychology.
We need something additional to the color word "green".
Color/Color Words/Grammar/Rule/Idea/Wittgenstein: it would be useless even to try to imagine red and green at the same time at the same place - on the other hand: useful: imagining to lift a man with one hand.
MooreVsWittgenstein e.g. (see above) ...red and green... is a rule for "and".
Color/Notion/Wittgenstein: in color words it is essential that we envision a mental image - but this is not a mental act that animates a symbol.
Color/General/Wittgenstein: the many instances of red have nothing in common - there is no thing that is common to all numbers.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996