|Functionalism, philosophy of mind: the thesis that mind states are functional states that can be described by input and output. See also identity theory, mind-body-problem, materialism, physicalism, mental states.|
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Functionalism/Avramidis: allows to refer to behavior with propositional attitudes, not on linguistic behavior - it allows a subjective image of the mind.
Problem: this requires an indefinite number of further propositional attitudes.
Functionalism/Lewis: we take mental concepts as theoretical terms (TT) - and define our mental-theoretical terms by reference to the platitudes (commonplaces) of folk psychology - these shall contain both, theoretical terms and the rest - then transform every theoretical term into a name - replace them with free variables - then existential closure (of the open formulas ((s) Ramsey sentence) - with that we achieve the original theory with the claim that it has a single implementation - then the theory has input/output concepts, but no specifically mental terminology - problem: how do we characterize input and output - BlockVsFunctionalism: either characterizes them chauvinistically or liberally - ((s) because a purely physical characterization of the inputs and outputs would include or exclude the wrong ones. )
AvramidesVsFunctionalism: if he is set to non-mentalistic characterization of the inputs and outputs, then he has to say what distinguishes mental from non-mental systems that have the same functional organization - Avramides: we always start with mentalistically characterized behavior - even with the marsians we say that his behavior must have an interpretation - so if normal evidence (block: not only linguistic, but mainly linguistic behavior) is part of our theory of propositional attitudes, we are committed to a symmetry between the semantic and the psychological.
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989